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宪法工程学是20世纪90年代中期以来比较政治研究中兴起的重要分支,并已产生了大量的研究成果,但仍然缺少一个统一的理论框架。本文试图把比较政治研究跟新古典经济学的方法结合起来,立足于经济人假设与制度分析的微观基础,建立一个基于“制度—行为—结果”的统一的宪法工程学理论框架。本文认为,稳定的一致政府是稳定而有效的民主政体的前提条件。宪法设计与政治制度安排的关键是能否为政治家与选民提供有效的激励结构,最终有利于形成稳定的一致政府。对高度分裂的社会来说,宪法设计与政治制度安排的重点是要为政治精英提供跨族群的激励,以及为不同族群集团的政治精英提供政治合作的激励。这样,本文阐明了宪法工程学的微观基础与制度机制,初步建立了一个统一的宪法工程学的理论框架。
Constitutional engineering is an important branch emerging from comparative politics research since the mid-1990s and has produced a large amount of research results. However, there is still a lack of a unified theoretical framework. This article attempts to combine the comparative political research with the neoclassical economics method and establish a unified theoretical framework of constitutional engineering based on the “system-behavior-result” based on the microscopic foundation of the hypothesis of economic man and institutional analysis. This paper argues that a stable and consistent government is a precondition for a stable and effective democratic government. The key to the constitutional design and political system arrangement is whether it can provide an effective incentive structure for politicians and voters and ultimately help to form a stable and consistent government. For highly divided societies, the focus of constitutional design and political institutional arrangements is to provide inter-ethnic incentives for the political elite and incentives for the political cooperation of the political elites of different ethnic groups. In this way, the essay clarifies the micro basis and institutional mechanisms of constitutional engineering and initially establishes a unified theoretical framework of constitutional engineering.