本文的研究属于经济学分析法学的范畴,试图以经济学方法探讨律师保密义务和追诉时效制度在确保公正的前提下可能出现的效率问题,从而分析这两项制度安排的合理性。本文通过对两者涉及的各相关主体进行以成本—收益分析为核心的行为分析,发现律师保密义务和追诉时效制度无法在较低的私人成本、社会成本支出水平上实现司法收益的最大化,即这两项制度导致了司法资源配置的低效率。 The research of this dissertation belongs to the category of economic analysis jurisprudence. It attempts to explore the efficiency problems that lawyers can oblige under confidentiality and prosecutorial statute of limitations in the premise of ensuring fairness by means of economics, so as to analyze the rationality of these two institutional arrangements. Through the analysis of the behavior of the relevant parties involved in the two, the core of which is cost-benefit analysis, we find that the lawyer’s confidentiality obligation and the system of prosecutorial limitation can not maximize the judicial return at a low level of private cost and social cost. That is, these two systems lead to inefficient allocation of judicial resources.