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本文从小额信贷机构面临的信贷风险和采用的贷款技术两个维度,综述并评论了小额信贷偿还机制方面的理论文献。现有理论文献分别解释了小额信贷机构采用连带责任、次序贷款、定期还款、小组基金等贷款技术,利用横向选择、横向监督、动态激励、分期偿付与担保替代等机制,解决金融中介机构常见的信贷风险问题(包括逆向选择、项目选择、努力程度选择、审计成本与策略性违约等)并最终有效提高还款率的机理。近20年来,对于小额信贷还款机制的理论研究,已经建立了横向选择、横向监督、动态激励机制的基本研究框架,并通过放宽假设、引入多样化机制、采用实验博弈方法等实现了向现实的逐渐逼近。
This article reviews and comments on the theoretical literature on the repayment mechanism of microcredit from the two dimensions of credit risk and the loan technology that MFIs face. The existing theoretical documents respectively explain that MFIs use such loan technologies as joint liability, sequential loan, periodic repayment and group fund, and utilize such mechanisms as horizontal selection, horizontal supervision, dynamic incentive, amortization and guarantee replacement to solve the problems of financial intermediaries Common credit risk issues (including adverse selection, project selection, effort selection, audit costs and strategic defaults, etc.) and ultimately the mechanism for effectively raising the repayment rate. In the past two decades, the theoretical research on microfinance repayment mechanism has established the basic research framework of horizontal selection, horizontal supervision and dynamic incentive mechanism. By relaxing the assumptions, introducing diversified mechanisms and adopting the experimental game method, Realistic gradually approaching.