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通过建立供应商与承包商之间的不完全对称信息动态博弈模型,运用信号博弈理论,分析了承包商与供应商在不同报价下的材料质量判断过程,探讨了承包商对供应商所供材料检查和不检查的概率,得出了承包商接受该报价的条件是其所承担的机会成本大于其所接受的报价,承包商选择加大检查力度的情况下,供应商若提供不合格材料,则双方都会承受巨大损失等结论;最后就如何避免供应商提供不合格材料提出了措施和建议。
By establishing a dynamic game model of incomplete symmetric information between suppliers and contractors, this paper analyzes the material quality judgment process of contractors and suppliers under different quotations by using the signal game theory, and discusses how the contractors’ Inspection and not to check the probability that the contractor to accept the offer on the condition that the opportunity costs borne by them is greater than the accepted quotation, the contractor chose to intensify the inspection of the case, if the supplier to provide unqualified materials, Then both sides will suffer huge losses and other conclusions; Finally, on how to avoid suppliers of substandard materials put forward measures and recommendations.