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我国2012年《著作权法(修改草案)》第七十六条将著作权法定赔偿的最高限额由《著作权法》中规定的五十万元提高至一百万元。学界普遍认为,其主要目的在于加强保护权利人权益,加大对侵权人的惩罚、抑制著作权侵权行为。但是,在混合策略均衡模型中,侵权人是否会选择侵权是由权利人的收益决定的。仅提高侵权人的赔偿额是否足以达到抑制侵权的理想效果、在此过程中侵权人与权利人的利益博弈将产生何种变化、呈现何种状态,这些均是值得探究的问题。从混合策略均衡理论出发,结合我国客观实际,对这些问题展开分析论证,旨在对寻找阻却侵权的最佳方案有所帮助和裨益。
The maximum amount of statutory compensation for copyright in Article 76 of the 2012 Copyright Law (Draft Amendment) in China is increased from 500,000 yuan prescribed in the Copyright Law to 1 million yuan. The academic community generally believes that its main purpose is to strengthen the protection of rights and interests of rights holders, increase penalties infringers, inhibit copyright infringement. However, in the mixed strategy equilibrium model, whether the infringer will choose to infringe is decided by the right owner’s profit. It is worth exploring that only increasing the infringer’s compensation amount is enough to achieve the ideal effect of suppressing infringement. In this process, what kind of changes will be made in the interest game between the infringer and the rightholder? Starting from the theory of mixed strategy equilibrium and combining with our country’s objective reality, these problems are analyzed and argued in order to help and find the best solution to stop the infringement.