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本文建立了一个简单的进入管制模型,并以信产部的手机“牌照制度”的实践为例,分析了新兴战略性产业的进入管制与管制绩效。本文发现,与认为进入管制容易引发垄断低效率的传统观念不同,在开放经济下新兴战略性产业初期由于外部性和高风险而导致本国企业进入不足;进入管制能够为先驱企业提供某种“专利”租金的机会,从而有助于企业提高产量,降低价格,增加社会总剩余。从长期来看,进入管制存在成本和容易激发企业的短视行为而影响产业效率,因此有必要逐步放开管制。另外,建立明确的竞争程序和规则来挑选进入者也是提高管制绩效的重要方面。
This article establishes a simple entry control model, and analyzes the entry control and regulatory performance of emerging strategic industries with the practice of the Ministry of Information Industry’s mobile phone “license system ”. This paper finds that, unlike the traditional notion of low monopoly efficiency in entry into regulation, in the early stage of an open economy, due to externalities and high risks, the entry of domestic enterprises into the emerging strategic industries is inadequate. Entry control can provide pioneer enterprises with some kind of “ Patented ”rental opportunities, which will help businesses to increase production, reduce prices and increase the total social surplus. In the long run, it is necessary to gradually liberalize the control system because of the existence of cost control and the easy-to-stimulate short-sighted behavior of enterprises. In addition, establishing clear competition procedures and rules to select entrants is also an important aspect of improving regulatory performance.