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2015年5月1日,我国银行开始依据《存款保险条例》缴纳存款保险。本文探讨了这一显性存款保险制度对商业银行风险应对机制的影响。在理想状态下,显性的存款保险制度有助于强化商业银行的风险管理意识,充实贷款拨备和自有资本。充足的贷款拨备和资本会进一步减轻存款保险公司的压力,从而形成应对风险的良性循环。但同时,风险差别保费也可能使商业银行产生调低贷款拨备、调高账面资本的机会主义动机,这样反而会恶化银行的风险管理机制。因此,这一存款保险制度的实施效果还有待事实检验。本文认为,在存款保险制度实施以后,监管部门应注意跟踪商业银行的贷款拨备、应计利润等会计指标——这些指标可以视为存款保险制度实施有效性的晴雨表。如果贷款拨备不升反降、应计利润大幅飘升,那么就表明制度有待优化,有关部门应在存款保险偿付限额、银行治理机制、风险评估体系和金融监管机制等方面加强制度建设。
On May 1, 2015, Chinese banks started to pay deposit insurance according to the “Deposit Insurance Regulations.” This article explores the impact of this explicit deposit insurance system on the commercial bank risk response mechanism. Ideally, a dominant deposit insurance system will help reinforce commercial banks’ awareness of risk management and enhance loan provisions and self-owned capital. Adequate loan provisions and capital will further reduce the pressure on deposit insurers, thus forming a virtuous cycle of responding to risks. However, at the same time, risk-based premiums may also cause commercial banks to generate opportunistic incentives to lower their loan provisions and raise their carrying capital, which in turn will aggravate the bank’s risk management mechanism. Therefore, the implementation of the deposit insurance system has yet to be fact-tested. This paper argues that after the implementation of the deposit insurance system, regulators should pay attention to tracking the commercial banks’ loan provisions, accrued profits and other accounting indicators - these indicators can be regarded as a barometer of the effectiveness of the deposit insurance system. If the provision for loans goes up instead of down and the accrued profits soar, then the system needs to be optimized. Relevant departments should strengthen institutional building in areas such as deposit insurance limits, bank governance mechanisms, risk assessment systems and financial regulatory mechanisms.