论文部分内容阅读
合理的相对业绩评价能够剔除不可控因素对代理人业绩结果的影响,从而减少委托人需要提供的风险补偿并提高契约的代理效率。本文采用实验研究方法检验有效契约假说关于管理者作为业绩评价主体使用相对业绩信息的决策行为。研究结果显示,担当管理者角色的被试在对目标部门进行业绩考评时会关注其他可比部门业绩信息,并且其给予目标部门的业绩评价主要受到相对业绩(与可比部门相比)而非绝对业绩的影响。本文的研究发现为理解管理者如何使用相对业绩信息提供了重要的实证证据。研究结论支持有效契约假说中关于委托人业绩评价策略和行为的理论预期。
A reasonable relative performance evaluation can eliminate the influence of uncontrollable factors on the performance results of the agents, thereby reducing the risk compensation that the principal needs to provide and improving the agency efficiency of the contract. In this paper, experimental research method is used to test the decision-making behavior of the effective contract hypothesis about managers using relative performance information as the subject of performance evaluation. The results of the study show that participants who perform the role of managers will pay attention to performance information of other comparable departments when performing performance evaluations on target departments, and their performance evaluations to target departments are mainly affected by relative performance (compared with comparable sectors) rather than absolute performance. Impact. The findings of this paper provide important empirical evidence for understanding how managers use relative performance information. The research conclusion supports the theoretical expectation of the client’s performance evaluation strategy and behavior in the effective contract hypothesis.