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由于我国竞争性领域政企分开不到位,需要通过建立“社会信托投资基金”实现政企分开的目的。基金投资者和基金管理者之间存在着委托—代理关系,由于信息不对称的存在,容易产生基金管理人隐藏行动的道德风险。本文根据我国当前基金管理激励合同的规定,通过基金管理费率和业绩指标两方面综合评判激励合同的最优性,得出最优的基金管理人激励合同需要作出以下两方面的调整:第一,基金管理费率应该从固定费率制改为浮动费率制;第二,业绩指标从绝对业绩指标改为相对业绩指标。
Since the separation between the government and enterprises in the competitive field in China is not in place, we need to establish a “social trust investment fund” to achieve the goal of separating government from enterprises. There is a principal-agent relationship between fund investors and fund managers. As a result of asymmetric information, there is a moral risk that fund managers hide their actions. In this paper, according to the provisions of the current incentive contract for fund management in our country, through the comprehensive evaluation of the optimality of the incentive contract through the fund management fee rate and performance indicators, it is necessary to make the following two adjustments to the incentive contract of the fund manager: , Fund management fees should be changed from a fixed rate system to a floating rate system; Second, performance indicators from absolute performance indicators to relative performance indicators.