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针对已有的基于计算Diffle-Hellman问题提出的无证书聚合签名方案构造了三种伪造攻击算法,攻击显示恶意但被动或者诚实但好奇的密钥生成中心均可伪造任意用户对任意消息的有效聚合签名,同时该方案也无法抵抗不诚实用户的合谋攻击。分析了原方案不安全的原因,通过在部分私钥生成阶段将用户公钥作为输入的参数,并在签名阶段将部分私钥与秘密值分别与不同的散列函数进行绑定,给出了高效的无需安全信道和双线性对的改进方案。改进方案的安全性可规约到更一般的离散对数困难问题。
Aiming at the existing certificateless aggregate signature scheme based on computational Diffle-Hellman problem, three kinds of forgery attack algorithms are constructed. The attack shows that a malicious but passive or honest but curious key generation center can forge any effective aggregation of any message to any user Signature, at the same time the program can not resist the collusion of dishonest users. The reasons for the original scheme’s insecurity are analyzed. By using the public key of the user as the input parameter in the partial private key generation phase and binding the partial private key and the secret value to different hash functions in the signature stage, Efficient solution without the need for secure channels and bilinear pairing. The security of the improved scheme can be reduced to the more general problem of discrete logarithm problem.