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联盟中渠道商的机会主义行为易降低汽车整车组装企业的获利能力,从而波及到分销渠道联盟的协同性。而基于锦标赛的耦合串并联合作结构正是解决联盟中汽车销售商机会主义行为的有效途径。本文首先发现锦标机制的激励效果取决于参与约束和激励相容约束、资源的稀缺性和分销商的资源需求强度以及分销商之间的相互作用;其次,对锦标机制机理建模得出:汽车整车组装企业通过提高奖励额度和奖励差额能增强对同质化分销商的激励作用,此外,通过扩大合作中的分销商数量,且同时进行惩罚能够降低外部不确定性环境因素,实现对联盟契约的帕累托优化,进而有效地改善联盟中的机会主义行为。
The opportunistic behavior of channel partners in the Union tends to reduce the profitability of automobile assembly enterprises, thus affecting the synergy of distribution channel alliance. However, it is an effective way to solve the opportunistic behavior of automobile dealers in alliances based on the coupling series and parallel cooperation structure of championship. This paper first finds that the incentive effect of the championship mechanism depends on the constraints of participation and incentive compatibility constraints, the scarcity of resources and the strength of the resource needs of distributors and the interaction between distributors. Secondly, the mechanism of championship mechanism modeling results: Vehicle assembly enterprises can enhance the incentives for homogeneous distributors by increasing the bonus amount and bonus difference. In addition, expanding the number of distributors in cooperation and punishing at the same time can reduce the external environmental factors of uncertainty, Pareto optimization contract, and thus effectively improve the alliance opportunistic behavior.