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文章选取2006～2010年中国A股市场16家上市银行为样本,研究不同激励方式与银行绩效的关系,并进一步检验行长权力强度是否使这一关系发生变化。同时,基于Oaxaca分解法分析行长权力强度对不同激励方式的解释能力。结果发现:(1)在三种激励方式中,政治激励能显著地提高绩效,但股权激励与绩效却没有明确的关系;(2)在行长权力强度较高时,薪酬激励与绩效的关系由负相关转变为正相关,政治激励、股权激励与绩效的关系却没有发生变化;(3)行长权力强度对薪酬激励差异的解释能力最强,政治激励次之,股权激励最弱。
The article selects 16 listed banks in China’s A-share market from 2006 to 2010 as a sample to study the relationship between different incentives and bank performance, and further tests whether the president’s power intensity changes the relationship. At the same time, this paper analyzes the power of the president to explain the different ways of motivation based on the Oaxaca decomposition method. The results show that: (1) Among the three incentive modes, political incentives can significantly improve performance, but there is no clear relationship between equity incentive and performance; (2) The relationship between compensation incentive and performance when the president’s power is high From negative correlation to positive correlation. There was no change in the relationship between political motivation, equity motivation and performance. (3) The power of bank governors has the highest ability to explain the differences in compensation incentive, the second is political motivation, and the weakest equity incentive.