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丹尼特是当代心灵哲学中幻想虚构论自我观的主要代表之一。然而,其基于“意向立场”心灵理论所论证的幻想虚构论自我观却并不成立。因为(1)意向立场心灵理论本身不能成立,(2)他严重忽视了自我概念在当代的新发展,(3)他关于“自我是人类的语言虚构和编造”的论证,关于“心灵现象仅仅是生物大分子的自动机制”的论证,以及关于“自我就是身体及其自动机制”的论证,都存在着严重的矛盾和错误。
Dennett is one of the main representatives of the fictionalist theory of self in contemporary philosophy of mind. However, its fictional fictional view based on the “intentional position ” theory of mind does not hold. Because (1) the intentional position that the mind theory itself can not be established, (2) he has seriously neglected the new development of self-concept in the present age, (3) his argument that “self is human language fiction and fabrication” The phenomenon of the mind is only an automatic mechanism of biological macromolecules, “as well as the argument that” self is the body and its automatic mechanism. "There are serious contradictions and mistakes.