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本文考虑由一个受政府碳排放规制且处于供应链上游的产品供应商和处于下游的零售商所组成的低碳供应链系统。由于低碳消费需求增加所引起的零售商利润的提高,下游零售商可采取不同的契约形式促进上游供应商扩大减排投资。为此,本文考虑了分享减排所增收益与分担减排投资成本两种契约。通过建立零供两主体的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出了在两种契约下主体的最优减排水平及最优分成比例,以及两主体在不同契约形式下的最优利润值。结果表明:分担减排投资成本契约能够使减排更加彻底,得到的减排水平较高;在分担减排投资成本契约下,两主体的利润值均会有所提高;在分享减排所增利润契约下,两主体的利润变化要依据参数来确定。最后,文章依据合理数据对上述结论进行了验证,并对碳交易价格等相关参数的敏感性进行了分析。
This article considers a low-carbon supply chain system consisting of a supplier of products regulated by the government and located upstream of the supply chain and a downstream retailer. Due to the increase of retailer’s profit caused by the increase of low-carbon consumption demand, downstream retailers can adopt different forms of contract to promote the upstream suppliers to increase emission reduction investment. To this end, this paper considers two kinds of contracts: sharing the benefits of emission reduction and sharing investment costs of emission reduction. By establishing a Stackelberg game model of zero-supply-two-body, the optimal level of emission reduction and the optimal ratio of the two parties under the two contracts are obtained, and the optimal profit of the two parties under different contractual forms is obtained. The results show that: the sharing of emission reduction investment cost contract can make more complete emission reduction, resulting in a higher level of emission reduction; in the sharing of emission reduction investment costs under the contract, the two subjects will have an increase in the value of profits; Profit contract, the two main changes in profits to be based on parameters to determine. Finally, the article validates the above conclusions based on reasonable data and analyzes the sensitivity of related parameters such as carbon trading price.