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本文试图通过历史还原分析方法来考察中国H+A交叉上市的动机并据此推测其经济后果。研究发现,H+A交叉上市源于中国政府主导的市场经济体制改革与国有企业改革,其动机可归结为政府干预下的强制性制度变迁。由于H+A交叉上市的反向顺序与政府干预,在国外文献中占主流的绑定假说并不适于分析中国的情形。中国香港的豁免、股份制改造的不彻底性、公司治理的趋同、法律移植的不系统性、政府干预与强制性制度变迁等因素,使我们无法先验的假设H+A公司的治理水平绝对的高于纯A公司,也无法根据该假设预测H+A公司具有比纯A股公司更优的业绩表现。但从H+A交叉上市的历史进程中可以推测,H+A公司比纯A公司受到更多的政府干预,从而承担了更重的政策性负担。由此导致的更严重的预算软约束会最终带来H+A公司更低的经营、投资以及资本配置效率,以及更低的财务业绩。这些推论与基于绑定假说所获得的推论相反,但更符合中国的历史事实,并可通过强制性制度变迁的成本来解释。
This paper attempts to examine the motivation of H + A cross-listing in China through historical reduction analysis and infer the economic consequences from this. The study found that the H + A cross-listing was originated from the Chinese government-led market economy system reform and state-owned enterprise reform. Its motivation can be attributed to the mandatory institutional change under the government intervention. Due to the reverse order of H + A cross-listing and government intervention, the binding hypothesis that is dominant in foreign literature is not suitable for analyzing the situation in China. The exemption of Hong Kong, China, the incompleteness of shareholding system reform, the convergence of corporate governance, the unsystematic legal transfer, the government intervention and the change of compulsory system make us unable to transcendental assumptions H + A company’s governance level is absolute Higher than Pure A, nor can it predict based on this assumption that H + A companies have better performance than pure A-share companies. However, from the historical process of H + A cross-listing, it can be speculated that H + A companies are receiving more government intervention than Pure A companies and thus assume a heavier policy burden. The resulting more severe soft budget constraint will ultimately lead to H + A’s lower operating, investment and capital allocation efficiency, as well as lower financial performance. These corollaries are the opposite of the corollary obtained based on the binding hypothesis, but more in line with China’s historical facts and can be explained by the cost of compulsory institutional changes.