TERRITORIAL disputes in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines notwithstanding， China-ASEAN relations remain very much on the track of peaceful development， mutual-benefit， and win-win cooperation. China recently raised new proposals on handling tensions in the South China Sea， so further diminishing possibilities that the issue may obstruct China and ASEAN member nations’advance towards economic and strategic cooperation. The U.S. is hence unlikely to achieve its goal of containing China， fragmenting ASEAN， and interfering in East Asian integration.
　　 U.S. Intentions
　　Disputes between China and some of its neighbors over certain islands in the South China Sea are a long-standing issue. China has made clear its stance： it will not cede sovereignty but is willing to shelve differences and conduct joint development of the disputed region with other concerned parties. From the 1970s onward for an extended period， the issue never became heated. Although contentions arose every now and then they were resolved through diplomatic measures， and the situation in the South China Sea remained largely stable.
　　After its high-profile return to the Asia-Pacific region in 2009， the U.S. accelerated military deployments and increased diplomatic input in the region. Since 2010 there has occurred a rapid succession of antagonistic events， including the sinking of the ROK’s Cheonan and spats over the Diaoyu Islands. By hyping these incidents and holding frequent military maneuvers， South Korea and Japan have tilted towards the U.S.， and relations between China and Vietnam and between China and the Philippines have become strained. Catch phrases associated with the East Asia situation are consequently changing from “economy， cooperation， and win-win” to “security， suspicion， and zero-sum.” Moreover， the U.S.-led AsiaPacific alliance， a Cold War legacy， is predominant in the American version of regional economic integration， wherein the U.S. intends to replace the 10+3 （10 member countries of the ASEAN plus China， Japan and the Republic of Korea） mechanism and the free trade zone mechanism between China， Japan and ROK with its Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement （TPP）. It will thus absorb the East Asia integration process into a U.S.-dominated framework.
　　In addition to disrupting East Asia integration， the U.S. also sets out to contain China’s peaceful rise by using the South China Sea issue to hype the so-called “China Threat.” By playing on historical issues in the region the U.S. stokes tension between China and some of its neighbors， utilizing the ensuing confusion to generate distorted international perceptions of China’s justified defense of its sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests. The U.S. thus smears China’s image of peaceful development by sowing misgivings throughout the international community about the country’s development path， so scuttling regional cooperation with China. 　　The U.S. is using the South China Sea issue to lure ASEAN off the course of cooperation with China. Its whipping up of confrontations between China and Vietnam and between China and the Philippines has sent Sino-Vietnam and Sino-Philippines ties plummeting to rock bottom. Anti-China sentiment has infiltrated all corners of society in both countries. There have been multiple instances of shootings of Chinese citizens in the Philippines， and massive antiChina riots have erupted in Vietnam. The U.S. is now doing all it can to help the two countries succeed in their claims through a joint statement from ASEAN. The aim is to spread anti-China sentiment emanating from the two countries
　　throughout the multi-lateral platform. Divisions over relations with China are already apparent among ASEAN member nations. This signifies that the organization is fragmenting and that its interests have been abducted， so inhibiting its further cooperation with China.


　　 Challenges to ASEAN
　　There are three reasons why the U.S. can play on the South China Sea issue. The first is the absence of a new security cooperation framework in East Asia. Regional cooperation is confined to the economic sector. That in other realms is sluggish and fraught with problems harking back to the Cold War period. This is why the Cold War era alliance is still at work in the Asia-Pacific today. Second is that of the inherent problems within ASEAN. The expansion of the organization brings into sharp relief the growing diversity of individual member states’ strategic goals and interests， but there is scant coordination in this regard. Since Lee Kuan Yew， Datuk Seri Mahathir Bin Mohamad， and Haji Mohammad Suharto bowed out， the ASEAN leadership has weakened， and its efficient， coordinative system gone. What’s more， core members of the organization show waning interest in regional integration. Third is the question of balance between the two big powers– China and the U.S. Out of pragmatic concerns， ASEAN members hope to reap gains from both China and the U.S.， namely， to gain economic benefits from China and security guarantees from the U.S. However， they would also like to see checks and balances between the two major countries that would give them more strategic autonomy and leeway.
　　In light of the roadblocks that the U.S. has set up to China-ASEAN cooperation， ASEAN faces three challenges. First， if ASEAN members lack the resolve to advance economic integration and the will to build a new regional security framework， the regional organization risks being substituted or marginalized by U.S.-led regional security and economic schemes. It might then deteriorate from a core political and economic force in the Asia-Pacific to a loose platform for dialogues， or even slip into demise. Sec-ond， should the ASEAN pivotal agenda be swayed by the South China Sea issue， the disparate stances of its members， arising from their different needs and pursuits， may lead to dissolution of the organization. Third， in the balance of power game， ASEAN will not benefit from any escalation of the South China Sea conflicts， as this would multiply the odds of confrontation between China and the U.S. ASEAN would not relish clashes between the two powerful countries because its members could not withstand the consequences. 　　 Future Expectations
　　There are three factors that would contribute to China and ASEAN circumventing the South China Sea trap.
　　First， strengthened economic cooperation between China and ASEAN makes it impossible for either side to substitute their economic interdependence for that with other countries. Over the period 2002 to 2013， bilateral trade soared from US $54.767 billion to US $443.61 billion. China is now ASEAN’s largest trade partner， and ASEAN has been China’s No.3 trade partner， fourth largest export market， and second largest import source for three successive years. August this year saw the start of negotiations to build an upgraded version of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Zone. It took just four years to establish and upgrade the FTZ， so testifying to both sides’ resolve to advance their economic cooperation. It is expected that economic cooperation between China and ASEAN will proceed on the tri-tracks of an upgraded FTZ， the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership （RCEP）， and the Maritime Silk Road. China has consequently set the goal of increasing bilateral trade to more than US $1 trillion by 2020. Economic cooperation is projected to continue providing the primary impetus towards regional peace and stability.
　　Second is the consensus China and ASEAN reached on solving the South China Sea issue through a “dual-track”approach. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed this in August at the ASEAN-China （10+1） Foreign Ministers’Meeting. It includes the addressing of relevant disputes by countries directly concerned through friendly consultations and negotiations in a peaceful way， and China and ASEAN countries jointly maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea. Wang’s counterparts in ASEAN countries warmly received this approach， so dashing the hopes of certain countries of “abducting” ASEAN to exert pressure on China over the South China Sea issue. It also provides a way out of the dilemma of balancing the national interests of individual ASEAN countries and their collective interests over the South China Sea issue， and clears the way for future economic cooperation between China and ASEAN.


　　The third factor is comprehensive cooperation between China and ASEAN in the sea and over security issues. This is a demonstration of both sides’ sincerity in trying to play down the South China Sea issue and steadily advance their strategic partnership. During the several meetings held in August between East Asian foreign ministers， China designated the year 2015 as the China-ASEAN maritime cooperation year. Its aim is to advance dialogue and cooperation among coastal countries of the South China Sea， and promote joint development at sea through dialogue and negotiations. The key areas for cooperation include maritime economy， communications over the sea， maritime environment， disaster prevention and relief， maritime security， and maritime culture. Meanwhile， China vowed to expand cooperation in the security field with ASEAN countries， and invited their defense ministers to attend the first informal China-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting in China in 2015. Its focus will be on non-conventional realms of security cooperation， such as disaster prevention and relief and combating cross-border crime.
　　Such progress inspires confidence in the strategic wisdom of ASEAN leaders and the bright future of the ChinaASEAN FTZ.