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本文选取我国上市公司2007-2014年的数据为样本,分析了上市公司是否会为了获得更多的政府补助进行盈余管理,并据此考察外部审计的影响。研究发现,上市公司通过负向盈余管理可以获得更多的政府补助。进一步发现,上市公司上一年度被注册会计师出具非标准审计意见,企业通过负向盈余管理会获得的政府补助会更少,并且上述关系在国有企业中更显著。实证结果表明,政府在发放补助时要考虑企业通过负向盈余管理来粉饰财务报表的可能性,实现政府补助的合理配置。同时,外部审计在一定程度上可以抑制企业通过负向盈余管理来获取政府补助的可能性。
This paper chooses the data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2014 as a sample and analyzes whether the listed companies will conduct earnings management in order to obtain more government grants and examine the impact of external audit accordingly. The study found that listed companies can obtain more government subsidies through negative earnings management. Further discovering that the listed company was issued a non-standard audit opinion by a certified public accountant in the previous year, the government will receive fewer government subsidies through negative earnings management, and the above relationship is more prominent in the state-owned enterprises. Empirical results show that when granting subsidies, the government should consider the possibility of the enterprises to make financial statements through negative earnings management and realize the rational allocation of government subsidies. At the same time, the external audit to a certain extent can inhibit the possibility of obtaining government subsidies through negative earnings management.