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本文从市场微观结构视角,研究我国上市公司股票流动性与董事会监督之间的经验关系,发现股票流动性与董事会监督强度之间呈正相关关系,在市场化进程更快的地区,上述关系更为显著;进一步分析表明,股票流动性主要通过股价信息含量与CEO薪酬契约机制发生作用;此外,股票流动性有助于增强董事会监督与代理成本之间的负相关关系。本文的研究结果表明,上市公司可通过提高股票流动性、引导投资者深入挖掘公司层面的特质信息,促使股价信息含量上升并设计出合理有效的薪酬契约,进而提高董事会监督效率,最终缓解委托代理问题。
This paper studies the empirical relationship between stock liquidity and the supervision of the board of directors of listed companies from the perspective of the market microstructure and finds that there is a positive correlation between stock liquidity and the supervisory strength of the board of directors. Significant; further analysis shows that liquidity of stock plays an important role mainly through the information of share price and the compensation mechanism of CEO. In addition, the liquidity of stock helps to strengthen the negative correlation between the oversight of the board of directors and agency costs. The result of this paper shows that listed companies can guide the investors to dig deeper into the trait of the company level by raising the liquidity of the stock market, promoting the information content of stock price and designing a reasonable and effective salary contract, so as to improve the supervision efficiency of the board of directors, problem.