本文在Dkmcmd(1991)模型中引入抵押品,研究企业信誉对企业债权融资工具选择的影响。主要结论有:(1)大型企业债权融资的可获得性不受其信誉水平影响;(2)中小型企业只有达到抵押贷款市场的信誉门槛,才能获取偾权融资;(3)银行甄别成本足够低时,中小型企业只会选择抵押贷款、信用贷款与信用债券三种债权融资工具。本文的模型能够解释Diam0nd(1991)无法解释的实证结论,并为国内中小型企业债权融资难问题的解决方向提供政策建议。 This paper introduces the collateral in the Dkmcmd (1991) model to study the impact of corporate reputation on the choice of corporate debt financing instruments. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) The availability of debt financing for large-scale enterprises is not affected by their creditworthiness; (2) Small and medium-sized enterprises can only access financing by financing if they reach the credit threshold of the mortgage loan market; (3) Low, SMEs will only choose mortgage loans, credit loans and credit bonds three kinds of debt financing instruments. The model in this paper can explain the empirical conclusions that Diamnd (1991) can not explain and provide policy recommendations for the solution of the difficult problem of debt financing for small and medium-sized enterprises in China.