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以163对软件外包关系为样本,利用多元层级线性回归法进行假设检验,旨在探讨领域知识专用性投资对接收方机会主义行为可能存在的独特影响,同时分析关系治理和合同治理的调节作用及相互关系。研究结果表明:(1)软件外包企业的领域知识专用性投资显著抑制了客户(专用性投资的接收方)的机会主义行为;(2)关系型规范和合同完备性不仅显著正向调节了领域知识专用性投资和客户机会主义之间的负相关关系,还直接抑制了客户机会主义行为;(3)合同完备性和关系型规范呈现某种程度的互补性;(4)与关系型规范相比,合同完备性的治理作用更为突出。以上结论揭示了领域知识专用性投资对接收方机会主义的独特影响,并深化了对合同完备性和关系型规范的治理作用的认识。
Taking 163 pairs of software outsourcing as a sample, this paper uses hypothesis testing by multi-level linear regression method to explore the unique influence that domain-specific knowledge investment may have on the opportunistic behavior of the recipient. At the same time, it analyzes the regulatory role of relational governance and contractual governance and Interrelationship. The results show that: (1) the domain-specific investment of software outsourcing enterprises significantly inhibits the opportunistic behavior of clients (the recipients of dedicated investment); (2) The relational norms and the completeness of contracts not only significantly regulate the field The negative correlation between knowledge-specific investment and customer opportunism also directly inhibits the client’s opportunistic behavior; (3) the completeness of the contract and the relational norms show some degree of complementarity; (4) Than the completeness of the contract the role of governance is more prominent. The above conclusions reveal the unique impact of domain-specific investment on receiver opportunism and deepen the understanding of the governance of contractual integrity and relational norms.