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针对同一海运市场中不同的海运企业——领导者与跟随者在设计多分配的轴-辐式海运网络时引起的竞争问题,突破已往枢纽港口集合是给定的假设,将航线连接设计扩展为可存在多条,引入基于服务约束(服务质量价格时间)的吸引力模型来定量表示托运人的选择行为,建立了竞争环境下基于服务约束的轴-辐式海运网络优化问题的数学模型,利用NCP函数、凝聚函数和增广Lagrange乘子罚函数法对这一问题进行求解。算例仿真结果显示:(1)跟随者在托运人考虑单位服务价格时,即使不存在规模经济效应,跟随者也可通过建立合适的枢纽港口来获取一定的市场机会;(2)跟随者在存在较大规模经济效应时其利润最可观,因采用比例模型,在不存在规模经济效应下跟随者在领导者决定设计不同数量的枢纽港口时其利润不会统一收敛于某一定值;(3)跟随者在领导者仅设计1个枢纽港口时可通过建立大量的枢纽港口来争夺丰厚的利润,但对于港口集合N={1,2,…,12}的海运市场,领导者只需设计2个以上枢纽港口时跟随者的利润空间便会受到较大挤压。
Aiming at the competition problems caused by different shipping companies in the same maritime market, leaders and followers in the design of multi-distributed axonal-spreaded shipping networks, it is a given assumption to break through the collection of former hub ports and extend the design of route connections to There may exist multiple articles, introducing attractive models based on service constraints (service quality price time) to quantitatively represent the shipper’s selection behavior and establish a service constrained axis-spreaded maritime network optimization problem under competitive environment The mathematical model is solved by using NCP function, agglomeration function and augmented Lagrange multiplier penalty function method. The simulation results show that: (1) followers can obtain certain market opportunities by establishing proper hub ports even if there is no scale economy effect. (2) followers in When there is a large-scale economic effect, the profit is the most significant. Because of the proportional model, the followers, in the absence of economies of scale, will not converge their profits to a certain value uniformly when the leader decides to design a different number of hub ports. Followers follow the example of a hub that designs only one hub port and can compete for huge profits by establishing a large number of hub ports. However, for the maritime market with a set of ports N = {1,2, ..., 12}, the leader only needs to design Profit margins of followers in more than two hub ports will be greatly squeezed.