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本文分析了消费信贷市场上隐含担保导致系统性违约的可能性。本文指出,由于存在政府隐含担保,金融机构防范系统性违约的激励会被削弱,对与系统性因素相关的违约将进行理性的忽视。因此本文认为,在讨论我国防范消费信贷违约风险时,不能只注重完善风险防范的制度而忽视了金融机构防范风险的主观激励。本文还对弱化隐含担保提供了一定的政策建议。
This article analyzes the possibility of implied guarantees in the consumer credit market leading to systematic default. This paper points out that due to the existence of government implied guarantees, financial institutions will be weakened incentives to prevent systemic default, rational default will be ignored for systemic factors related to default. Therefore, this article believes that in discussing the risk of default in consumer credit in our country, we should not only focus on perfecting the system of risk prevention but neglect the subjective incentives of financial institutions to prevent risks. This article also provides some policy suggestions for weakening implicit guarantee.