本文全面考察了中国过渡性资本外逃的现实:由于政府对国内外不同的投资者实施差别待遇,部分投资领域对内开放不足,在一定程度上导致国内资本闲置和过渡性资本外逃。文章通过构建一个政府和企业之间关于超国民待遇不同程度的博弈模型,从理论上剖析过渡性资本外逃形成的内在机制,揭示了程度较高的内外资差别待遇和对内开放不足是过渡性资本外逃形成的主要动因,诠释了我国改革开放以来对外商投资采取部分超国民待遇政策的理论背景,分析了过渡性资本外逃对中国经济产生的负面效应,并就如何治理过渡性资本外逃提出了相应的对策建议。 This article examines the reality of China’s transitional capital flight: As a result of the government’s differential treatment of different domestic and foreign investors, some investment fields are not sufficiently open to the domestic market, to a certain extent leading to the idle and transitional capital flight of domestic capital. By constructing a game model between government and enterprises with varying degrees of super-national treatment, the article analyzes the internal mechanism of the formation of transitional capital flight theoretically, revealing that the degree of differential treatment of domestic and foreign capital is transitional to the problem of domestic openness The main motivation for the formation of capital flight is the interpretation of the theoretical background of the partial super-national treatment policy on foreign investment since China’s reform and opening up. The negative effects of the transitional capital flight on China’s economy have been analyzed and the countermeasures for how to manage the transitional capital flight have been put forward Corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.