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产业组织间合谋问题包含产业垂直间及水平间合谋。转售价控制作为产业垂直间合谋竞争者地位主要差异表现,其整体经济价值的决定在动态竞争环境下面临着原有合谋解的瓦解和新合谋解达成的可能。本文理论证明,动态竞争环境下两家同质化的制造商分别使用各自的服务商体系其结果可能会带来更大的行业整体利润。本文应用动态面板技术,以中国最具活力的两个三角地区为实证对象进行验证,从社会整体福利角度证明这种非合谋方式是更有效率的。本文得出的结论主要有两个:一是从组织间的垂直联系看,合谋是一种非效率活动,且各自服务商有非合谋的冲动,其冲动能力大小与企业创新外部性和服务商的谈判力密切相关;二是间接证明了制造业与服务业的合谋更多的是一种经济价值分割而非创造,现有的产业间垂直关联是脆弱非平衡态,这种非平衡态存在着临界条件。本文基于上述结论提出了相应的建议和对策。
The conspiring problem among industrial organizations includes collusion between vertical and horizontal industries. Resale price control, as the main difference manifestation of the vertical position of collusion between industries, is that its decision of the overall economic value faces the possibility of the collapse of the original conspiracy solution and the new conspiracy solution in a dynamic competitive environment. The theory of this paper proves that the result of two service providers’ systems using two homogenous manufacturers under dynamic competition environment may bring more profit to the whole industry. In this paper, we use dynamic panel technology to verify the two most dynamic triangle regions in China and prove that this non-collusive way is more efficient from the perspective of overall social welfare. The conclusions drawn in this paper are mainly two: First, from the perspective of the inter-organizational vertical relations, collusion is a non-efficiency activities, and their service providers have the impulse of non-conspiracy, the impulse capacity and enterprise innovation externalities and service providers Is indirectly related to the bargaining power of the two industries. Second, it indirectly proves that collusion between manufacturing and service industries is more of an economic value rather than a creation. The existing vertical linkages among industries are fragile and non-equilibrium states. Critical condition. Based on the above conclusions, this article puts forward the corresponding suggestions and countermeasures.