这篇实证论文主要分析2009年至2013年中国上市公司盈余管理和公司治理的三个要素之间的关系。在这篇文章中,可操纵性应计利润将代表盈余管理,通过修正琼斯模型来评估相关的数据。为了评估两者之间的关系,研究将会用到面板回归。在这个回归中,可操纵性应计利润作为因变量的同时,董事会独立性,董事会规模和审计质量将会作为自变量。除此之外,财务杠杆,ROA和公司规模将在回归中作为控制变量呈现。根据实验结果和结论,董事会规模,董事会独立性和盈余管理均呈现负相关关系但是审计质量对盈余管理并没有影响。与此同时,所有的控制变量都与可操纵性应计利润显著性相关。 This empirical paper mainly analyzes the relationship between the three elements of earnings management and corporate governance in Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2013. In this article, discretionary accruals represent earnings management and correlate the data by revising the Jones model. In order to assess the relationship between the two, the study will use panel regression. In this regression, manipulative accruals as dependent variables, board independence, board size and audit quality will be used as independent variables. In addition, financial leverage, ROA and firm size will be presented as controlling variables during the return. According to the experimental results and conclusions, there is a negative correlation between the size of the board of directors, the independence of the board of directors and earnings management. However, the quality of auditing has no effect on earnings management. At the same time, all the control variables are related to the significance of discretionary accruals.