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众所周知,Wittgenstein在《Philosophische Untersuchungen》(简称PU)第258节中提出一种反对“私人语言”(Privatsprache,简称PES)存在可能性的论证(该论证简称PA)。但是分析PA的具体步骤,指出Wittgenstein认为PES不可能存在的真正理由,却并不容易。笔者认为,有些哲学家在这一点上误解了Wittgenstein,例如,E.von Savigny,N.Mal-colm和S.Schrder.本文的主要任务是提供一个对PA具体步骤具有可靠性的描述。文章第一部分为第二部分的讨论作准备。澄清PA的步骤,纠正一些Wittgenstein的阐释者的错误,也是S.Schrder自己在他的著作《Das Privatsprachenargu-ment》中的目标。在本文2.1至2.3节中,我们将借用他的基本思路展开讨论(这三个小节各自的核心议题都是Schrder已经处理过的,而且本文作者讨论这些问题的顺序也和他相同),但在具体问题上的论证方法却与他不一样。在2.4节中,我们将证明Schrder自己的阐释观点也有不可取之处。此后,会提出自己认为正确的对PA的步骤的分析(2.5节)。以此为基础,我们会对Schrder针对第258节中的PA提出的一种批评意见进行反批评(2.6节)。
It is well-known that Wittgenstein proposed in Section 258 of “Philosophische Untersuchungen” (PU) an argument against the possibility of “Privatsprache (PES)” (PA). However, it is not easy to analyze the specific steps of PA and point out that Wittgenstein believes that the real reason that PES can not exist exists. The author believes that some philosophers misunderstood Wittgenstein at this point, for example, E. von Savigny, N. Malcolm, and S. Schröder.The main task of this paper is to provide a description of the reliability of concrete steps of PA. The first part of the article prepares for the second part of the discussion. Clarifying PA steps to correct some Wittgenstein interpreters’ mistakes is also the goal of S. Schröder himself in his book “Das Privatsprachenargu-ment.” In sections 2.1 to 2.3 of this article, we will borrow his basic ideas to discuss (the core topics in each of these subsections are already dealt with by Schröder, and the authors discuss the same order in these issues) But the method of argumentation on specific issues is different from him. In Section 2.4, we will prove that Schröder’s own interpretation of point of view is also undesirable. After that, we will come up with the right analysis of PA steps (section 2.5). Based on this, we will criticize Schrder’s criticism of the PA in Section 258 (Section 2.6).