论文部分内容阅读
本文利用“芝加哥”学派利益集团理论的基本假设,对我国电力产业内部人势力的形成、强化及其行为对市场交易的扭曲进行了详尽的分析,从而为当前电力产业规制困境的发生提出了一个基于制度偏好和企业行为的解释。结果表明,在缺乏有效规制的背景下,对自然垄断产业实施等同于一般产业的“放权让利”式改革,为利益集团的成长提供了制度条件和资金支持。由于管制权力分散在诸多的“条块”之间,“厂网分开”后也没有建立权威性的专业机构,不同利益取向的参与者之间的博弈使电力产业的规制放松陷入困境。
Based on the basic assumptions of interest group theory of “Chicago” school, this paper analyzes in detail the formation and strengthening of inside forces in China’s electric power industry and the distortions of their behavior in market transactions, and puts forward a proposal for the current power industry regulation predicament Explanations based on institutional preferences and business practices. The results show that under the background of the lack of effective regulation, the “decentralization of power and profit sharing” reform for the natural monopoly industries provides the institutional conditions and financial support for the growth of the interest groups. Due to the decentralization of regulatory power among many “blocks”, there is no authoritative professional establishment even after the “separation of plant and network”, and the game between players with different interest-oriented conditions has put the regulation of the power industry in a difficult position.