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对美国住房政府赞助企业的风险管理工具和风险管理策略实践进行定性和定量分析评价的结果表明,在次贷危机中住房政府赞助企业风险积聚的原因是:住房政府赞助企业在风险管理工具的使用中为降低成本,采取了不完美对冲策略;为追求高收益,利用其较低的融资成本购买私人标准抵押贷款债券以获得套利收入;在不具备合理的目标实现路径时,向政府监管目标压力妥协,扩大了风险暴露。政策性金融机构的逐利行为会放大信贷风险,忽视监管目标的实现路径是风险积聚的隐患。因此,我国的政策性住房金融机构应该提高自主监管能力,建立完美风险管理策略。
The qualitative and quantitative analysis of the risk management tools and risk management strategy practices conducted by the U.S. housing government-sponsored enterprises shows that the risk accumulation of housing-government-sponsored enterprises in the subprime mortgage crisis is due to the fact that housing-government-sponsored enterprises use risk management tools In order to reduce costs, to take an imperfect hedging strategy; in pursuit of high yields, using its lower financing costs to buy private standard mortgage loans in order to obtain arbitrage revenue; in the absence of a reasonable path to achieve the goal of regulatory pressure on the government Compromise, expanding the risk exposure. The profit-seeking behavior of policy-oriented financial institutions will amplify the credit risk, neglect of the regulatory path is the risk of accumulation of risk. Therefore, China’s policy-oriented housing finance institutions should enhance their ability to supervise independently and establish a perfect risk management strategy.