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当需求随机时,通过比较包含一个制造商与多个供应商的上游段实施VMI前后的收益,首先建立Stackelberg博弈的价格补贴模型,但是该模型中,制造商自身的最大收益与供应链整体最大收益存在矛盾,于是提出基于Nash谈判的收益共享契约,可使供应链整体收益最大,但是当某些成员的谈判实力较弱时,收益却不如价格补贴下的收益。于是以价格补贴下的收益为起点,对供应链的最优收益进行Nash谈判。结果表明:与单独使用价格补贴或者基于Nash谈判的收益共享契约相比,以价格补贴模型下各方收益为起点进行的Nash谈判不仅使供应链整体期望收益最大,供应链各成员的收益也获得了提高。
When the demand is random, we first establish the price subsidy model of Stackelberg game by comparing the returns before and after implementing VMI with the upstream segment consisting of one manufacturer and multiple suppliers. However, in this model, the maximum profit of the manufacturer and the whole supply chain Therefore, the contract of revenue-sharing based on Nash negotiation is proposed, which can maximize the overall return of the supply chain. However, when the negotiation strength of some members is weak, the return is not as good as the price subsidy. So starting from the benefits of price subsidies, Nash talks about the optimal return to the supply chain. The results show that the Nash negotiation starting from the return of all parties under the price subsidy model not only maximizes the expected return of the supply chain as a whole, but also gains the members of the supply chain, compared with the price-sharing contract alone or Nash negotiation. Improve.