以我国沪深A股上市公司2010—2014年数据为样本,实证检验了董事长总经理两职合一、盈余管理与过度投资三者之间的关系。研究结果表明:盈余管理程度与过度投资具有显著正相关关系;董事长总经理两职合一这种制度安排不仅导致了过度投资行为的发生,而且加剧了盈余管理程度对过度投资水平的正向影响。 Taking the data of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as samples, this paper empirically tests the relationship between the two positions of the general manager, earnings management and overinvestment. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of earnings management and overinvestment. The institutional arrangement of the two directors, the general manager of the board of directors, not only leads to overinvestment behavior but also exacerbates the positive effect of earnings management on overinvestment influences.