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从居民效用与开发商收益视角下,以Smith租差理论为基础,构建多智能体模型,并结合纳什均衡解决居民修缮决策博弈,模拟中产阶层化进程。研究表明:在效用最大时,增加居民收入将降低中产阶层化发生频率。而在利润最大时,开发商资本的投入与中产阶层化发生频率正相关。资本投入越大,中产阶层化发生频率越高。但资本并非万能,当它的投入超出限值时,中产阶层化进程渐趋稳定。提高开发商投资门槛,将强化房地产业的垄断,开发商为获取巨额垄断利润,一方面,他们可能故意提高局部地区的资本化地租,这导致了中产阶层化更快、更多地发生;另一方面,他们在任意区位开发都能获取高额利润,这间接造成中产阶层化程度下降。
From the perspective of resident utility and developer benefit, Smith multi-agent model is constructed based on the theory of Smith lease-tenancy, and Nash equilibrium is used to solve the residents decision-making game to simulate the process of middle class. The research shows that when the utility is maximum, increasing resident income will reduce the frequency of middle class. At the most profitable time, the investment of developer capital is positively correlated with the frequency of middle class. The larger the capital investment, the higher the frequency of middle class. However, capital is not a panacea. When its investment exceeds its limit, the process of middle class stratism gradually stabilizes. On the one hand, they may deliberately raise capitalized rent in some areas, which leads to the middle class becoming faster and more likely; on the other hand, developers may deliberately raise capitalized rent in some areas; on the other hand, developers should increase the monopoly of the real estate industry. On the one hand, they can obtain high profits in any location development, which in turn causes the middle class to decline.