风险投资者与风险投资家之间存在一种委托-代理关系,风险投资家在项目的投资过程中起着关键性作用。制定一种显性的连续支付模式,对风险投资家起着一种极强的激励作用。要求风险投资家对项目注入一定的资本金,可有效防范风险投资家投资的草率行为,并能缩小投资者的代理成本。由此,本文构建了一种新的激励机制模型,为风险投资者建立合理的支付契约提供了依据。 There is a kind of principal-agent relationship between venture capitalists and venture capitalists. Venture capitalists play a key role in the investment process of the project. The development of a dominant continuous payment model, VCs play a very strong incentive. Require venture capitalists to inject a certain amount of capital into the project, which can effectively prevent the risky investment behavior of investors and reduce the agency cost of investors. Therefore, this paper constructs a new model of incentive mechanism, which provides a basis for venture investors to establish a reasonable payment contract.