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本文运用社会学和制度经济学理论,以信任关系构建为出发点,阐述了企业政治关系对外部独立审计的替代效应,然后给出了中国民营上市企业2003—2008年的证据。实证结果表明,相对于无政治关系的民营企业,有政治关系的民营企业没有高质量审计需求,有政治关系的民营企业审计质量更低;作为审计风险的应对,审计师则对有政治关系的民营上市企业收取了风险溢价。本文研究结论表明,政治关系是中国资本市场独立审计的一种替代机制,外部独立审计要发挥其应有的作用,还有待于法律法规等市场配套措施的建设及其完善。
Based on the theory of sociology and institutional economics and the construction of trust relations, this paper expounds the substitution effect of corporate political relations on independent external auditing, and then gives the evidence of Chinese private listed companies in 2003-2008. The empirical results show that, compared with non-state-owned private enterprises, private-owned enterprises with political relations do not have high-quality audit needs and private-owned enterprises with political relations have lower audit quality. As a response to audit risk, Private listed companies charged a risk premium. The conclusion of this study shows that political relations are an alternative mechanism for independent auditing of capital markets in China and that external independent auditing should play its due role, pending the construction and perfection of market supporting measures such as laws and regulations.