笛卡尔《第一哲学沉思集》中的《第三沉思》的形而上怀疑可以概括为这样一幅图景:我(即笛卡尔的沉思者)是可能如此不完美的,以至于创造我的作者(一个全能的欺骗者)甚至在我认为(I think)我清楚分明感知到的简单命题上欺骗我。本文通过解释这个形而上怀疑如何相关于那些清楚分明感知的简单命题或公理而澄清它的真正怀疑对象或外延。我的分析表明笛卡尔式的公理/简单命题没有真正的所谓的回忆起的清楚分明感知,而只有当下的清楚分明感知。在此基础上,我对《第三沉思》形而上怀疑的怀疑对象的四种解释的进行系统分析:解释[i]主张怀疑对象是每个被回忆起的清楚分明感知的公理;解释[ii]主张怀疑对象是每个当下清楚分明感知的公理;解释[iii]主张怀疑对象是每个当下的以及被回忆起的清楚分明感知的公理;解释[iv]主张怀疑的间接对象是每个当下的或/和被回忆起的清楚分明感知的公理,其直接对象是某种一般性的东西,这个东西可以把单个清楚分明感知的公理归入其名下且它的否定与单个公理相矛盾。我为解释[ii]辩护,论证解释[i]是不可能的,解释[iii]不得不最终坍塌为解释[ii],而解释[iv]虽然在哲学上是可能的,但却被笛卡尔的文本所反对。所以解释[ii]是唯一可接受和可信的对《第三沉思》形而上怀疑的外延的解释。 The metaphysical suspicion of “third contemplation” in Descartes’ “First Meditative Meditations” can be summed up in the picture that I, the meditator of Descartes, may be so imperfect that my author An omnipotent deceiver) cheated me even on simple propositions I perceived clearly and clearly as I think. This article clarifies its real suspicion or denotation by explaining how this metaphysical doubt relates to those simple propositions or axioms that are clearly and clearly perceived. My analysis shows that Cartesian axioms / simple propositions have no real, so-called recollection of clear and distinct perceptions, but are only now clearly and distinctly perceived. On this basis, I conduct a systematic analysis of the four interpretations of the suspicious object of metaphysical suspicion in “Third Meditation”: Explain [i] that the object of suspicion is every well-known axiom of clear and distinct perception; [ii] Proposing that the object of suspicion is an axiom of every moment that is clearly and distinctly perceived; [iii] proposing that the object of suspicion is an axiom of every moment and of being clearly and unequivocally remembered; [iv] the indirect object of suspicion is every present Or / and remembered axioms that are clearly and distinctly perceived, the direct object of which is something of a generic nature that can attribute a single well-articulated axiom to its name and its negation to a single axiom. I defended interpretation [ii], arguing that it is impossible to explain [i], explaining [iii] that it had to eventually collapse to explain [ii], while explanation [iv] was philosophically possible but was rejected by Descartes Against the text. Interpretation [ii] is therefore the only acceptable and credible explanation of the metaphysical extension of “third contemplation.”