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“入世”后,国内越来越多的产业遭受国外产品的倾销,然而只有极少数行业拿起反倾销的武器保护自己。文章在多人贡献博弈的框架下分析了行业反倾销申诉问题,得出在混合策略均衡下行业提起反倾销申诉的概率与总申诉成本收益比成反比关系、与厂商数量成反比关系,证明了行业协会参与是打破这种均衡并提高全行业福利的方法,并提出了提高产业集中度和加强行业协会建设的建议。
After China’s accession to the WTO, more and more industries in China suffer dumping of foreign products. However, only a few industries take anti-dumping weapons to protect themselves. The article analyzes the industry anti-dumping complaint under the framework of multi-player contribution game, and draws an inverse relationship between the probability of anti-dumping appeal filed by the industry and the total appeal cost-benefit ratio under the hybrid strategy equilibrium, which shows that the industry association Participation is a way to break this balance and improve the welfare of the whole industry. Some suggestions are put forward to improve industrial concentration and strengthen the construction of trade associations.