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在考虑渠道间比价行为下,构造了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,求得了制造商与零售商竞争时的最优策略和利润。研究结论表明:随着比价消费者比例的增加,网络渠道的销售价格与服务水平增加,传统零售渠道的销售价格下降,制造商的最优利润增加,零售商的最优利润减少,供应链整体利润呈递增的规律;当市场全覆盖时,零售商的最优决策是不提供服务。
Considering the inter-channel bidding behavior, a two-stage Stackelberg game model consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer is constructed and the optimal strategy and profit of the manufacturer and retailer are obtained. The research results show that with the increase of ratio consumers, the sales prices and service levels of online channels increase, the sales prices of traditional retail channels decrease, the optimal profit of manufacturers increases, the optimal profit of retailers decreases, and the overall supply chain The law of increasing profits; when the market is fully covered, the optimal decision of retailers is not to provide services.