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近年来,上市公司业绩持续下滑与高管薪酬差距快速上升的反向变动日益引发公众的质疑和学者的关注。在权变效应视角下,从知识管理领域中引入“高管团队知识合作需求”概念为调节变量,通过分析中国2009—2012年制造业上市公司非平衡面板数据,验证并探讨知识合作需求对经理自主权与高管薪酬差距关系的调节效应作用机理。结果表明,中国制造业上市公司高管团队知识合作需求能够显著削弱经理自主权对高管薪酬差距的正向操纵效应。因此,高知识合作需求时,高管薪酬差距决策权更大程度上应归属CEO;而低知识合作需求时,高管薪酬差距决策权要牢牢掌控在董事会手中为好。
In recent years, the continuous decline of the performance of listed companies and the rapid rise of the pay gap of executives reversed the rising public concern and scholars attention. In the perspective of contingency effect, we introduce the concept of “knowledge cooperation needs of senior management team” from the perspective of contingent management as a control variable to verify and discuss the demand of knowledge cooperation by analyzing unbalanced panel data of manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2012 in China Regulatory Effect Mechanism of the Relationship between Executive Autonomy and Executive Compensation Gap. The results show that the knowledge cooperation needs of senior management team of listed manufacturing companies in China can significantly weaken the positive manipulation effect of manager’s discretion on executive pay gap. Therefore, when the demand for knowledge cooperation is high, the decision-making power of the executive pay gap should be attributed to the CEO to a large extent. However, when the demand for knowledge cooperation is low, the decision-making power of the executive pay gap should be firmly controlled by the board of directors.