随着国有经济的战略性改组，一种全新的现代企业经营者激励方式呼之欲出，这就是经理股票期权制。 对经营者的激励问题源于现代公司的两权分离──即所有权与经营权的分离。经理人员受聘于董事会，在董事会的授权范围内具体负责企业的日常经营管理工作，超越权限的决策和被公司 With the strategic reorganization of the state-owned economy, a brand new approach to the incentive of modern business operators can be expected. This is the stock option system for managers. The incentive problem for managers stems from the separation of the two rights of the modern company ─ ─ that is, the separation of ownership and management rights. Managers employed by the board of directors, in the authority of the board of directors responsible for the specific day-to-day management of enterprises, beyond the authority of the decision-making and the company