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本文突出制度环境,研究了政府干预对国有企业管理者薪酬激励效应的影响。同时,比较了政府这一制度约束与管理者权力这一契约安排之间的制衡关系。通过实证分析发现,政府干预程度越低,管理者盈余管理的空间越有限,薪酬与企业真实绩效的敏感度越强,但这一现象只存在于管理者权力较小的企业。在管理者权力较大的企业,薪酬自定现象明显,政府干预的减少并未弱化管理者的权力,也没有提高薪酬激励效应。本文的结论进一步验证了制度环境对管理者激励契约的重要影响,并对现有相关文献加以扩展,指出了契约安排内的权力取向会削弱制度环境的影响。
This article emphasizes the institutional environment and studies the influence of government intervention on the incentive effects of SOE managers. At the same time, we compared the checks and balances between the institutional constraint of government and the contractual power of manager. Through empirical analysis, it is found that the lower the degree of government intervention, the more limited the manager’s earnings management space and the more sensitive the remuneration and the real performance of the enterprise, but this phenomenon only exists in the enterprises with less powerful managers. In enterprises with larger management power, the self-determination of salaries is obvious. The reduction of government intervention does not weaken the power of managers nor does it improve the salary incentive effect. The conclusion of this article further verifies the important influence of institutional environment on the incentive contract of managers and expands the existing relevant literature, pointing out that the power orientation within the contractual arrangements will weaken the impact of institutional environment.