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构建了一个不完全信息条件下,电动汽车研发补贴动态博弈模型。基于边际成本定价准则,建立了政府研发补贴政策与企业研发投入之间的关系,分别从降低电动汽车的市场价格、提高企业研发投入比例以及改善政府与企业总收益的目标出发,计算局中人的最优策略并对相关影响因素进行了分析。数据表明,提高研发投入比例对降低电动汽车的市场价格具有决定性作用;在理想的政策环境下,存在唯一的补贴力度能够同时实现最优研发投入比例最大化以及最优市场价格最小化的目标,却无法同时令政府与企业的短期收益之和取得最大值;持续改善管制环境有利于提高管制效率,而侧重于鼓励技术成果转化及市场推广的政策更具效果。
Under the condition of incomplete information, a dynamic game model of EV R & D subsidy is constructed. Based on the marginal cost pricing principle, the paper establishes the relationship between government R & D subsidy policy and R & D investment. From the goal of reducing the market price of electric vehicles, increasing the R & D investment ratio and improving the government and enterprise’s total revenue, The optimal strategy and related factors were analyzed. The data show that increasing the R & D investment ratio plays a decisive role in reducing the market price of electric vehicles. Under the ideal policy environment, the only subsidy exists that can maximize the proportion of the optimal R & D investment and minimize the optimal market price. However, it is not possible to maximize the sum of short-term returns between the government and the enterprises at the same time. Continued improvement of the regulatory environment will be conducive to the enhancement of control efficiency. Policies that focus on encouraging technological transformation and marketing will be more effective.