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本文运用中国上市公司数据研究了高管(董事长或总经理)的政府任职背景这一政企纽带(political connection)对企业异地投资的影响。我们发现,企业高管拥有的政企纽带能够帮助企业到注册地以外的其他省份去开设下属企业(子公司、联营企业或分公司),但这种影响出现的条件是政企纽带达到较高的级别(厅局级以上),而低级别的政企纽带不起作用,并且这种影响主要存在于地方政府控制的公司中。同时,我们发现,在非政府控制的公司中,高管在中央政府部门的任职经历也有助于企业跨省投资。而在中央政府控制的公司中,高管的政企纽带对异地投资没有显著影响。
This paper uses the data of Chinese listed companies to study the influence of the political connection between senior executives (chairman and general manager) on the government investment in enterprises. We find that government-enterprise ties owned by senior executives can help enterprises to open subordinate enterprises (subsidiaries, affiliates or subsidiaries) to other provinces except the registered place, but the condition for such influence arises when the level of the government-enterprise linkage reaches a higher level (Departmental level or above), while the low level of government-enterprise link does not work, and this effect mainly exists in the local government-controlled companies. At the same time, we find that senior management positions in the central government sector also contribute to cross-provincial investment among non-government controlled companies. Among the companies controlled by the central government, the relationship between the government and the enterprises of senior executives has no significant effect on the investments in different places.