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传统的电力规划方法割裂了发电规划与输电规划的内在联系,忽略了电力投资多主体决策之间的相互影响,并且难以处理项目投资价值的不确定性问题,因而无法适应电力市场环境。文中运用Black-Scholes(B-S)期权定价模型,采用非合作博弈理论对多投资主体的发电和输电项目延迟投资决策进行评估,从而使电力企业(发电公司或电网公司)做出更合理的投资决策,也便于电力监管机构了解市场信息,制定合理政策协调厂网规划。实际系统算例表明,当某种类型电力企业数量较少时,其投资决策对于市场各方影响较大。
The traditional power planning method breaks down the inherent relationship between power generation planning and transmission planning, neglects the mutual influence between multi-agent decision-making of power investment, and it is difficult to deal with the uncertainty of project investment value and thus can not adapt to the power market environment. This paper uses the Black-Scholes (BS) option pricing model to evaluate non-cooperative game theory on delayed investment decisions of power generation and transmission projects in multi-investment entities, so that power companies (power generation companies or power grid companies) make more rational investment decisions , But also facilitate the electricity regulatory agencies to understand the market information and formulate reasonable policies to coordinate plant planning. The actual system example shows that when the number of a certain type of electric power enterprises is small, the investment decision has a great impact on all parties in the market.