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在证券市场中,虚假财务信息会增加上市公司财务信息的价值,从而增加收益。但该公司的造假行为同时损害了投资人的利益,扰乱金融市场秩序,造成社会损失。政府会制定相应的惩罚政策来监督和规范上市公司的行为,同时由市场繁荣、罚款等增加财政收入。因此,政府需要平衡收入和社会损失成本。根据政府的政策,上市公司选择财务信息的造假比例,从而影响了投资人需求。本文将研究政府与上市公司之间的博弈,初步建立分散模型。
In the securities market, false financial information will increase the value of listed companies financial information, thereby increasing revenue. However, the company’s counterfeiting also damaged the interests of investors, disrupted financial market order and caused social losses. The government will formulate corresponding punitive policies to supervise and regulate the behavior of listed companies, and at the same time increase the fiscal revenue from market prosperity and fines. Therefore, the government needs to balance the costs of income and social losses. According to the government’s policy, listed companies choose to counterfeit the proportion of financial information, thus affecting the needs of investors. This article will study the game between government and listed companies, and initially establish a decentralized model.