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文章基于不完全契约和资源基础理论,考察了联盟中企业家和大公司谈判力的动态变化,及其对企业家创新行为的影响。通过建立两阶段博弈模型,研究认为,在契约不完全和知识产权保护力度较弱时,大公司对企业家核心知识资源的窃取是导致企业家谈判力下降的客观原因。这种情况下,企业家可能通过激进的创新活动来获取连续创新能力,从而维持其在再谈判中的地位。但是,这种冒险性的行为会损害新企业的价值。最后,文章对如何实现帕累托改进提出了建议。
Based on the incomplete contract and the basic theory of resources, the article examines the dynamic changes of the bargaining power of entrepreneurs and big companies in the alliance and their impact on entrepreneurial innovation behavior. Through the establishment of a two-stage game model, the study suggests that theft of core knowledge resources by large companies is the objective reason for the decline of the bargaining power of entrepreneurs when the contract is incomplete and the protection of intellectual property is weak. In this case, entrepreneurs may gain continuous innovation through radical innovation activities so as to maintain their position in the renegotiation. However, this risky behavior can undermine the value of a new business. Finally, the article puts forward suggestions on how to improve Pareto.