用制度经济学分析,大体可归纳为以下三组原因。1、比较直接的原因:干部考核体系与财税体制导致地方政府行为微观化。长期以来衡量官员的政绩,片面地用GDP指标。加上实行分税制后,地方政府又有独立的经济利益。经济利益驱动与政治晋升驱动两股力量的合流,形成“双驱动”机制。由于GDP实际至上,地 With institutional economics analysis, can be summarized in the following three groups of reasons. 1, the more direct reason: cadre examination system and fiscal system led to micro-local government behavior. Officials have long been measuring the performance of officials, one-sided use of GDP indicators. Coupled with the implementation of the tax-sharing system, local governments have independent economic interests. Economic interest-driven and political promotion drive the confluence of the two forces to form a “dual-driven” mechanism. As GDP actually supremacy, to