论文部分内容阅读
自从法兰克福对“多重可能性原则”(即,只有当行为者在行动时有其它的可能性时,他才对该行动负道德责任)提出了他著名的反例以来,哲学界围绕法兰克福式反例是否成功推翻了这一原则展开了大量争论。这些争论主要围绕两个问题:一是法兰克福式反例是否存在不当预设,一是法兰克福式反例是否存在不当遗漏。对这两个问题的探讨,揭示出对法兰克福式反例的最佳理解可能与人们的最初印象很不同,而这一揭示也将关于道德责任的讨论从“多重可能性”问题引向更为深层的问题。
Since his famous counter-example against Frankfurt’s “principle of multiple possibilities” (that is, he assumed moral responsibility for the operation only when the actor has other possibilities when he was acting), the philosophy of Frankfurt around the Frankfurt There has been a great deal of debate over whether the counter-example succeeded in overturning this principle. These controversies mainly focus on two issues: First, whether there is an improper presupposition of the Frankfurt counter-example, and whether there is an improper omission of the Frankfurt-type counter-example. The discussion of these two issues reveals that the best understanding of the Frankfurt counter-example may be very different from the first impression of the people and that this revelation also leads the discussion of moral responsibility from the “multiple possibilities” For deep problems.