无论是基于经济激励还是政治晋升激励,地方政府总有干预金融发展的内在动机。本文关注于政府干预与金融系统之间政治关联所产生的经济效应特征及其间接传导路径的识别问题。通过将关键变量发挥作用的时间演变趋势以及政府干预与金融发展二者的联合作用纳入回归模型,本文的主要结论是,地方政府干预与金融抑制性发展二者的政治关联仅仅在一定时间范围内有益于经济增长,在2008-2011年度范围之后,地方政府已经无法再继续通过干预金融系统来缓解各自对于经济增长的负面影响。基于中介效应检验方法在识别政府-金融联合作用的间接路径时发现,前沿技术效率和资本配置效率仅发挥了较低比例的非完全中介效应。本文的经验分析结论警示我们,我国的财政支出管理体制与金融体制改革仍然充满挑战。 Whether based on economic incentives or political promotion incentives, local governments always have the inherent motivation to intervene in financial development. This article focuses on the economic effects of political linkages between government intervention and the financial system and the identification of indirect pathways. The main conclusion of this paper is that the political relationship between the intervention of local governments and financially inhibited development is only within a certain period of time by incorporating the time evolution trend of key variables into play and the combined effect of government intervention and financial development. Benefiting from economic growth, local governments will no longer be able to ease their negative economic growth by intervening in the financial system after 2008-2011. Based on the mediating effect test method, when identifying the indirect path of the government-finance joint effect, it is found that the cutting-edge technology efficiency and capital allocation efficiency only play a lower proportion of non-complete mediating effect. The empirical analysis of this paper draws the conclusion that China’s fiscal expenditure management system and financial system reform are still full of challenges.