以多任务委托-代理理论为基础,分析工程项目动态联盟运行过程中总包商与分包商间的委托代理关系,设计工程项目合作伙伴管理过程中总包商对分包商的多任务激励模型。在模型优化和求解的基础上,对相对激励强度进行比较静态分析。结果表明,总包商对于重要性高的任务的激励力度高于重要性低的任务的激励力度;同时,对于不确定性较低任务的激励力度也大于不确定性较高任务的激励力度;随着两个任务可替代性的增强,这种较高的激励力度应得到进一步加强,以便合理配置资源,使工程项目联盟的效用最大化。 Based on multitasking principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship between the main contractor and the subcontractors in the process of dynamic alliance operation and designs the multi-task incentive of the main contractor to the subcontractors during the management of the project partners model. On the basis of model optimization and solving, comparative static analysis of relative incentive intensity is carried out. The results show that the main contractor is more motivating than the less important task for the tasks of high importance while the incentives for the tasks with lower uncertainty are greater than the tasks of higher uncertainty. As the replaceability of the two tasks is enhanced, such higher incentives should be further strengthened in order to allocate resources rationally and maximize the utility of the project alliance.