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信息不对称和分部经理努力激励不足是ICM配置中的主要问题,总部可以针对分部经理设计最优的薪酬激励契约,解决上述问题。文中加入了以前文献忽略而又重要的两个因素:分部项目间的质量差异和相关性,运用机制设计理论构建ICM配置模型。研究结果表明:ICM存在平均主义现象,即总部投资了过多(过少)的资源在弱(强)分部中。这种偏好随项目质量差异程度的提高而提高;项目质量的相关性弱化了ICM平均主义现象,而分部经理努力的相关性加剧了这种现象。
Asymmetric Information and Stimulus of Branch Manager Incentives are major issues in ICM configuration. Headquarter can design the optimal salary incentive contract for branch managers to solve the above problems. In the article, two factors that were neglected but important in the previous literature were added: the quality differences and correlations between sub-projects, and the mechanism design theory to construct ICM configuration model. The results show that there is an egalitarian phenomenon in ICM, that is, the resources invested in the headquarters are too much (too little) in the weak (strong) branches. This preference increases as the quality of the project varies; the relevance of project quality weakens ICM egalitarianism, which is exacerbated by the relevance of divisional manager efforts.