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本文通过对基于违规干预下理性信贷员博弈模型的建立与分析,得出:对于不合规的贷款,在以领导满意度为支付的情况下,理性信贷员会选择签字放贷的策略。接着对信贷员博弈结果的影响进行分析,然后对博弈结果的直接原因和间接原因进行分析:直接原因主要是“签”或“不签”的直接后果与领导的行政干预;间接原因主要是由于制度及其执行的有效性,人事权的直接或间接控制,员工的职业道德,银行内部人际关系复杂等。进而讨论针对银行经营管理的相应对策与建议:银行机构应从制度、文化、道德层面加强内部“自律”。文章重点涉及博弈论的应用,对制度安排的讨论等,对银行的经营管理具有一定的现实与理论意义。
Through the establishment and analysis of the game model of rational loan officers based on noncompliance intervention, this paper draws the conclusion that in the case of non-compliant loans, under the condition of satisfaction of leadership, rational credit officers will choose the strategy of signing loans. Then we analyze the influence of loan officers’ game results, and then analyze the direct and indirect causes of the game results. The direct cause is mainly the direct consequence of “signing” or “not signing” and the leading administrative intervention. The indirect The reasons are mainly due to the effectiveness of the system and its implementation, the direct and indirect control of personnel rights, the professional ethics of employees and the complicated interpersonal relationships within banks. And then discuss the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for bank management: the banking institutions should strengthen the internal “self-regulation ” from the institutional, cultural and moral levels. The article focuses on the application of game theory, the discussion of institutional arrangements, etc., which have certain realistic and theoretical significance to the bank’s management.